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An Unfulfilled Promise: The Genocide Convention and the
Obligation of Prevention
Abstract
This article addresses the under-theorized dual-mandate of the United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention was drafted
in the wake of the Holocaust and other Nazi genocidal atrocities committed during World
War II. The primary mission of the Genocide Convention was to establish a uniform
definition of this scourge, and insert its prevention and punishment into the list of
obligations states hold within the current international legal regime. Based on the past 70
years, it is clear that the international community has overwhelmingly failed to uphold the
Genocide Convention’s prevention mandate. The Convention and its signatories have been
more successful in punishing perpetrators posthaste (e.g., the 1940s Nuremburg and Tokyo
trials; the 1990s tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and the International
Criminal Court). Eyeing the failure of the international community in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, the Canadian government created the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty that created the doctrine of the “Responsibility to
Protect” (R2P). The article argues that R2P has filled part of the gaps in the Genocide
Convention and allowed states to take affirmative actions to prevent genocide in the
modern era (e.g., Libya 2011).
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Introduction
The United Nations drafted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter referred to as Genocide
Convention) in the aftermath of near universal recognition that Adolph
Hitler’s Nazi Germany attempted to systematically exterminate the Jewish
population and other minority, so-called, “pariah” groups in Nazi occupied
lands during the Second World War.1 In 1941, Winston Churchill declared
the Nazi’s actions to be immoral and so severe that they amount to “a
crime without a name.”2 Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer and
human rights activist, was personally affected by the Nazi extermination of
European Jews. So much so that he coined the term “genocide” and
subsequently devoted his entire postwar life to advocating its eradication.
The Genocide Convention was drafted three years after the conclusion of
World War II. The Convention established a dual-mandate among its
signatories.3 As the official title of the Convention states, treaty members
must take actions to “prevent” and “punish” the crime of genocide. This
dual-mandate or “dual-pronged” treaty has created, by its elastic definition
of genocide, difficulty in fulfilling its own mandate to prevent future
genocides.4
This article explores the Genocide Convention’s mandate to prevent largescale intentional killing of unarmed civilians who identify as a protected
group, its limitations in accomplishing this obligation, and how The
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine may supplement the convention’s
limitations of prevention in future episodes of mass political violence. Section
two unpacks the legal criminal definition of genocide and its limitations.
Section three explores the Genocide Convention’s prevention mandate, while
section four investigates the emergence of R2P as a source of support for
states in preventing genocide. Section five provides three examples of
contemporary conflicts and how R2P may be used to supplement the
Genocide Convention’s shortcomings. Finally, section six concludes with
several observations in how policymakers, practitioners, and academics
address emerging threats from violent state and non-state perpetrators.

Defining and Identifying the Legal Criminal Definition of
Genocide
Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention makes any actions committed with
the intent to exterminate, “in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group” genocide. The UN recognizes the following acts as genocide:
(a) Killing of members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction, in whole or part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
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(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.5
The legal criminal definition falls under two universal categories of
international law: Obligatio erga omnes and jus cogens.6 The former are
crimes that supersede any individual state’s borders and represent a threat to
all humankind. The latter—jus cogens—are crimes that under no
circumstances states or their nationals can commit, regardless of exigent
circumstances: Crimes such as genocide, slavery, and piracy; constitute
actions that threaten the welfare of all states. The international community
has deemed these behaviors illegal and immoral in perpetuity under every
circumstance. The legal criminal understanding of genocide has become the
referent definition scholars have used for decades, despite three limitations.
First, the Genocide Convention establishes a dual-mandate of its signatories
to prevent and punish individuals who intend to destroy one of the four
protected groups: National, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Determining
intent requires the “establish[ment] beyond a reasonable doubt [of] the
appropriate mode of liability or form of participation by the accused in the
relevant crime,” in other words, the plain delineation beyond an objective
threshold that an individual has set out to systematically murder unarmed
civilians on a massive scale.7 The requirement for establishing intent prior to
the behaviors associated with genocide under points a through e of Article II
has led governments to deny complicity in this criminal act absent written or
agreed upon documentation of orders that explicitly call for the extermination
of a group. The question of intent has become a hotly debated issue in
international relations where accused perpetrators deny claims based on this
requirement. It has also become a common political and legal defense in
recent decades (for example, the controversy in Turkey over the term
genocide to describe the massacre of Armenians during World War I).8 The
difficulty in proving intent, in real-time, has created a daunting task for the
international community; therefore, this mandate limits the effectiveness of
prevention strategies to retroactivity and not concurrent with exigent
circumstances. This de facto, retroactive process of prevention does little to
thwart genocides from emerging, as does the politics of genocide
acknowledgment.9
Second, the Genocide Convention limits the application of genocide to four
protected groups, that is, national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups. The
restrictive application of the convention was accomplished through
considerable negotiations and debate among permanent UN Security Council
members and other drafters of the Convention’s text, eventually agreeing
upon these four specified groups as earning the status of protection under
international law.10 The UN’s minimalist definition excludes groups that form
because of political affiliation, gender, sexual orientation, or others categories
and prohibit these groups from claiming protective rights under the Genocide
Convention. The narrow legal definition of genocide, as set forth in the 1948
convention, led to a lacuna between legal scholars’ understanding of genocide
and the academy’s conceptualization. This divergence between the legal crime
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and social processes established by academics has held back our collective
understanding of what can constitute genocide for decades.
Third, the phrase “mental harm” creates challenges of application under
Article II, point b of the convention.11 The category of mental harm is vast,
establishing causality from behaviors associated with points a through e
under Article II is difficult, particularly in measuring perpetrator effects on
survivors’ mental state. Point b requires “serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group” be carried out; no threshold is set for establishing
mental harm (or other indicators). This disjuncture between individual harm
and group harm is problematic and creates gray areas under international
law, and limits the ability of courts to punish such unseen effects from said
crimes. The shortcomings of the legal criminal definition of genocide have led
scholars to redefine the operationalized definition in the decades since 1948.

A Dual-Mandate: Prevent and Punish the Crime of Genocide
As discussed above, in brief, the Genocide Convention establishes two
obligations for states. First, states should work to prevent mass atrocities
from developing into genocidal massacres. Second, any state may and should
punish perpetrators of this crime, as it maintains erga omnes and jus cogens
status.12 With respect to the former, four issues arise under the Genocide
Convention for its members to engage in successful prevention methods.
First, there is an identification problem. Under the Genocide Convention
member-states (of the UN) must prove “intent” exists within the minds of the
perpetrators in order for the convention to take effect. As discussed above
proving intent can be an arduous task, particularly, when government records
are classified and no paper trail exists. Proving intent makes prevention in the
short term exceedingly difficult and near impossible.
For example, the twentieth century’s most swiftly executed genocide occurred
in a small landlocked country in East Africa just over twenty years ago. The
1994 Rwanda genocide consumed between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsi and
moderate Hutu lives coupled with an approximately 200,000 deaths
associated with the concurrent civil war. The Rwanda genocide transpired
over 100 days, but in fact, a far-superior amount of the killing took place
within the first six to eight weeks.13 The vast amount of killing emerged
because of the assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana on April
6 and lasted for three weeks.14 There were two subsequent spikes for killing in
the following three-five weeks. Under the Genocide Convention, members
would have had to establish intent by the government and Interahamwe,
grassroots militias, in order to have sanctioned the indigenous peacekeepers
to take appropriate action to stop and prevent the genocide from evolving.
The Rwanda case is a well-known failure for many reasons, one of which is
the international community’s failure to recognize genocide from civil war or
ethnic conflict and to prevent such actions from occurring on a massive
scale.15 Additionally, the issue of proving intent held up authorized
intervention forces from deploying to the war zone and participating in
ending the bloodshed. Critiques of the intervention used this necessary piece
22
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to stymie genocide recognition and slow the process of response. Proving
intent before action is the Achilles heel of the Genocide Convention.
The second issue pertains to process. Once identification is established that
there is a genocide occurring, a process issue emerges. Members must go
through the UN Security Council and receive Chapter VII approval before
embarking on a humanitarian military intervention.16 The process to obtain
official recognition is rigid and often mechanical in nature compared with
dynamic events on the ground. This official recognition requirement
mandates that member states must proceed through the UN Security Council
before engaging in a legal humanitarian military intervention.
Third, there is the international legal concept and norm of state sovereignty.
This adds additional complexity to the mix when using the Genocide
Convention to prevent such large-scale intentional killing of unarmed
civilians. The final issue is tactics, that being, the chance of success for such a
humanitarian military intervention to succeed in stopping genocide from
progressing.17 These four issues emerge under the Genocide Convention when
states seek to prevent this crime. The next section explores R2P doctrine as a
mechanism for supplementing the Genocide Convention’s prevention
processes. In other words, relying on R2P allows for the elimination of the
first and potentially second issues discussed above, thus improving the
likelihood of success, dramatically.

The Emergence of R2P as Genocide Prevention
The notion of absolute state sovereignty has evolved over the past two
centuries. Since the Treaty of Westphalia states have reserved the right of
absolute sovereignty over the territories they control, govern, and
manage.18 This notion of absolute state sovereignty has evolved over time
because of increasing “transsovereign problems.”19 In recent years, under
international law and as a response to grave human rights violations that
have resulted in tens of millions of civilian deaths throughout the
twentieth century, the international community have carved out
exceptions to state sovereignty and bestowed obligations upon the state as
well.20 With the emergence of jus cogens states were restricted in the
breadth and depth of possible actions taken (for example, there can be no
slavery, piracy, or genocide under any circumstances).
As the twentieth century ended the international community comprised of
states, international nongovernmental actors, and global citizens reflected on
the mass atrocities perpetrated throughout the previous century. In 2001,
human rights activists and leaders working for the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) first drafted the proposed
doctrine of R2P.21 The emergence of R2P, for the first time in human history,
provided obligations upon the state to protect its population but if the state
neglected to do so transferred this obligation to the international community,
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de facto, placing a higher authority above the state during episodes of extreme
violence.
The Responsibility to Protect establishes two basic principles. First,
embedded within the “concept of sovereignty” is a notion that the state
maintains a “responsibility to protect its populations [from harm].”22 This is a
basic responsibility of the state. Second, if the population of a state is facing
“serious harm, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert
it, the responsibility to protect those people lies in the international
community.”23 This article restricts the scope of analysis to presumed cases of
extreme political violence that rise to the magnitude and definition of
genocide. Given these major episodes of extreme violence, R2P may act as a
safety mechanism that supports the Genocide Convention in preventing the
emergence of such acts in the twenty-first century. Section three details four
issues that arise when employing the Genocide Convention’s prevention
mandate. In short, using R2P, the international community can eliminate in
some cases the mass murder of protected groups by governments abrogating
their solemn duties.
The first issue is an obligation to prove intent to destroy a protected group in
whole or part under the Genocide Convention. The benefit of “R2P [is that it]
explicitly eliminates the specific intent requirement” of the Genocide
Convention.24 Eliminating the intent requirement enables states to respond
directly to R2P’s Just Cause Threshold, that being, “large scale loss of life,
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not.”25 This reduces, if not
eliminates the politicization of the term genocide and in its place organizes
the international community around a response to extreme violence that is
causing the death of unarmed civilians on a massive scale.
Second, under the Genocide Convention there is a formal process for states
and the international community writ large to appeal to the Security Council
to authorize such interventions to save lives.26 Under R2P states, regional
organizations, and the Security Council are capable of taking actions given
certain criteria are met.27 There are four precautionary principles established
by R2P before action is authorized. Any state or regional organization intent
on employing R2P must establish the “right intention” principle, meaning the
intervention must be executed primarily to “halt or avert human suffering”
this cannot be a secondary, tertiary or other cause.28 The principle of right
intention prohibits the use of R2P for the advancement of a state’s own
geostrategic interests. Second, the use of force must be a last resort and not
the first alternative in taking action against a violating state. Humanitarian
military intervention is a costly endeavor full of difficulties. One of the
complicating factors of humanitarian military interventions is that of second
order effects that stem from the intervention (in other words, more civilians
may be killed because of the intervention from collateral damage or direct
harm in some cases). Third, there must be proportional means employed by
the intervening state(s). This principle requires states to use proportional
military means that would eliminate the human suffering but not exceed or
exacerbate the conflict in any conceived manner. Finally, there must be a
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reasonable prospect of success. If humanitarian military intervention is
unlikely to bring about a conclusion to the conditions that are leading to
human suffering then R2P should not be employed by a member state
because the likelihood of success is significantly reduced, if not absent.
These four precautionary principles guide the use of force under R2P and may
supplement the Genocide Convention’s mandate to prevent the spread of
large-scale intentional killing of a protected group that would result in their
destruction in whole or part. States or regional organizations are not required
to progress through the Security Council in exercising the use of force under
R2P. This is one option available to member states but they may also engage
in direct intervention if these precautionary and guiding principles are met
and the state’s intentions are clearly laid out and transparent to the
international community.
Jeffrey Bachman classifies the distinction between sovereignty as defined by
the Peace of Westphalia and R2P. Bachman notes sovereignty under the
Peace of Westphalia establishes the right of “territorial integrity or political
independence,” in other words, states are deemed the supreme governing
authority within their geographically defined territory, and the actions taken
by the states are not questioned by its equal partners around the globe.29
Under R2P, the notion of sovereignty “emphasizes the responsibility of the
governing authority for the welfare of its population.”30 This concept of state
sovereignty is in line with the drafter’s intent of the Genocide Convention to
protect groups from persecution, though R2P enables greater pragmatic
prevention methods than the convention for reasons stated above.
Finally, as addressed in section two one restriction on the ability to prevent
genocide is the narrow definition of the crime. Essentially the targeting of a
group that identify based on political affiliation in place of a national, ethnic,
racial or religious foundation is pragmatically similar. The Responsibility to
Protect enables the international community to respond to cases of genocide
that are similar by academia standards if not international law. This being,
the intentional killing of unarmed civilians who identify based on political
affiliation. The Responsibility to Protect supplements the Genocide
Convention in providing legal protection of the four named groups; but R2P
increases the protection to all human beings facing extreme conditions of
suffering by perpetrators. Therefore, R2P is a supporting doctrine that can
help prevent genocide in the twenty-first century but it is a stand-alone
doctrine that, when used, can help save human lives beyond the legal criminal
definition.

Contemporary Conflicts and R2P
Three recent conflicts that, at least on paper, are amenable to an R2P style
intervention: The Yazidis in Iraq, Rohingya Muslims in Burma (Myanmar),
and Libyans in Benghazi (circa 2011). Let us examine each of these
humanitarian crises in turn.
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On June 29, 2014 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed leader of the socalled Islamic State (ISIS) declared its seized territories in Iraq and Syria a
caliphate.31 ISIS is a Salafi – ultra-conservative Sunni Islamic movement –
whose near term goal is to establish a sovereign territory in the Levant region
of the Middle East. As an ultra-conservative militant organization, ISIS has
singled out the ethnic and religious minority group Yazidis in Iraq as “devil
worshippers” for persecution.32 The Yazidis, numbering less than one million
people, largely reside in northern Iraq.33 The Yazidis practice an
amalgamation of various religious traditions of Christianity and Islam. The
Yazidis have faced many genocidal massacres in their history, including at
least 72 separate pogroms under the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th
centuries alone.34 Given their long running marginalization in the region and
ISIS’s quick seizure of land, the Yazidis became a prime target for
extermination in 2014-2015.
Within six weeks of declaring its caliphate, ISIS attacked the northern Iraqi
town on Sinjar, home too many Yazidis in the region, and forced
approximately 30,000 to flee into the Sinjar Mountains. At the time of this
attack, the United States had yet to form The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
and US president Barack Obama declared, “As commander in chief, I will not
allow the United States to be dragged into fighting another war in Iraq.”35
Though ultimately an inaccurate statement, Obama authorized “targeted
airstrikes” by US air force assets against ISIS positions in Iraq to protect both
US personnel and “prevent potential genocide of minority groups.”36 Within
several weeks of this targeted intervention by US, Iraqi, and Kurdish forces,
the US would officially announce its coalition to combat ISIS and significantly
ramped up its intervention force in the region – which remains in the region
today. This limited action by US and allied forces is considered a “light” R2P
intervention given the justification for action.
The second conflict amenable to an R2P intervention is Burma (Myanmar’s)
present-day genocidal campaign against Rohingya Muslims. Though
unrecognized by Burma’s government, the Rohingya have resided in western
Burma since the precolonial era.37 In 2012 and 2016, communal violence
broke out across Rakhine state, a western province home to most Rohingya
Muslims. Though initially perpetrated by local political entrepreneurs, “the
subsequent military operation saw over a thousand homes burnt to the
ground, as well as allegations of rape perpetrated by Burmese forces against
Rohingya civilians.”38 For years, Muslims in Burma have faced widespread
societal discrimination, with many innocent Islamic practitioners often
inappropriately compared to ISIS or al-Qaeda militant organizations.39
In many ways the Tatmadaw, Burmese Armed Forces, have followed a long
held process of genocide preparation. Burmese officials ordered the
confiscation of “sharp and blunt objects” that could be used for protection by
Rohingya civilians, then trained and armed local non-Rohingya civilians,
deprived the Rohingya of food and other aid, systematically built-up
Tatmadaw security and military personnel in the western regions, and finally
order the looting, burning of villages, rape, forced relocation, and widespread
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murder of Rohingya Muslims.40 Since the government-led “clearance
operations” began, more than 700,000 Rohingya have been forced from their
homes and have sought refuge in Bangladesh.41 The evidence is clear, Burma’s
Tatmadaw continue to commit, enact, prescribe, coerce, mastermind, or
otherwise engage in humanity’s most abominable crime – genocide. In
November 2017, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called the situation
“ethnic cleansing.” As of December 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières has
estimated that at least 9,400 Rohingya have died, among which 6,700 died
from violence, shootings, torture, rape, or immolation, and another 647,000
have fled to neighboring Bangladesh (now more than 700,000). It is
important to note, it is likely that these figures underestimate the true cost
and violence perpetrated against the Rohingya – due to the enormous
difficulty in counting civilian causalities in authoritarian states. Given the
enormity of the situation, Burma is ripe for an R2P humanitarian military
intervention to protect the lives, dignity, and cultural heritage of Rohingya
Muslims. Yet none has taken place.
Finally, the third humanitarian crisis, which embodies the spirit of R2P, is the
US-led humanitarian military intervention in Libya (circa 2011). On March 17,
2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved Resolution 1973, which
authorized military intervention in Libya to protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas from attack. “The goal, Obama explained, was to save the
lives of peaceful, pro-democracy protesters who found themselves the target
of a crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi.”42 This intervention
is often lauded as the quintessential R2P example, and in some respects, it is.
The international community, led in this case by western powers, advocated
for the protection of civilians in eastern Libya who were specifically targeted
for mass murder by the regime. Within hours of the UNSC Resolution’s
passage, a multi-state NATO-led coalition began bombarding regime units on
their way toward Benghazi. This humanitarian military intervention is largely
credited with saving the lives of civilians located in eastern Libya, principally
the city of Benghazi. Despite initial success of the R2P-style intervention, the
Libyan model poses some risks. First, R2P does not establish a uniform
timetable for withdrawal. As such, the NATO-led coalition was successful in
routing Libyan troops from exterminating civilians in the east; however, the
intervention lacked any long-term follow through in creating a stable
governing regime. Though initiated under the auspices of good intentions, it
is possible that the second order effects of the 2011 intervention outweigh the
short-term benefits.

Conclusion
One lesson learned from the Holocaust and articulated by A. Dirk Moses in
2011, was one significant problem remains, particularly in contemporary
Western societies, that the Holocaust is still portrayed as “the epitome of
evil.” Therefore, if mass violence does not mimic the signs and symptoms
of the Holocaust it can be excluded as non-genocidal. Despite much
advancement in international law, technology, and human rights during the
twentieth century as many as 350 million people were intentionally killed by
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governments or organized groups.43 The 1948 Genocide Convention was an
attempt to eliminate the scourge of genocide from human experience. The
convention establishes two mandates: The prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide. The former has gone unfilled. The international
community has had greater progress with punishing the crime of genocide,
though much work remains, but prevention of this extreme violence has
eluded the international community for decades. With the creation of the R2P
doctrine in the early 2000s, the international community has established a
better prevention and intervention mechanism for states and regional
organizations to employ in times of great human suffering and genocide.
This study articulates the benefits of R2P in supporting and enhancing the
prevention mandate of the Genocide Convention. Until R2P’s emergence on
the scene, the international community could at best respond to
circumstances of genocide after the fact but were hard pressed to engage in
prevention methods. The Responsibility to Protect provides states and
regional organizations with the legal and normative ability to engage in
prevention and intervention to stop the crime of genocide and other largescale human suffering. Since R2P’s emergence the record has not greatly
improved but we have witnessed some positive cases of intervention that
saved lives (for example, Iraq 2014; Libya 2011). The international
community no longer has its hands tied by the Genocide Convention, with the
advent of R2P. Only time will tell if this new international legal norm will
suffice in preventing genocide from emerging again.
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